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THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTONOMY
IN MUNICIPAL EARNINGS TAXATION:
THE ST. LOUIS EXPERIENCE
KENNETH JOHN HEINZ*
Modern American cities exist in a Looking Glass World. The more
they tax, the more they fall behind in the demand for revenue. In
the past 15 years annual municipal revenue has increased from 10 to
33 billion dollars, but annual municipal expenditures have likewise
increased from 11 to 34 billion dollars, and debt outstanding has
skyrocketed from 16 to 44 billion dollars." This increased revenue
demand stems from several factors including, the wage and price
inflation spiral, the need to replace the deteriorating physical plant
of the older cities, and the demand for higher quality municipal
services created by a higher standard of living and an increased level
of social conciousness.2 These problems are compounded by the fact
that the single most important source of local tax revenue in the past,
the property tax, has suffered a declining tax base in central cities as
holders of personal and corporate wealth migrate to suburbia.3
Major cities have realized the inadequacy of present forms of mu-
nicipal revenue production in the race to narrow the gap between
municipal revenue and expenditures. Federal and state aid to local
governments through grants-in-aid and revenue sharing is limited by
the amount of new revenue produced and the purposes for which
*B.A., University of Illinois, 1971; J.D., Washington University, 1974.
1. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES 426 (1972).
2. See J. HELLERSTEIN, STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION 11-12 (3d ed. 1969);
R. SIGAFOoS, THu MUNICIPAL INCOME TAx: ITS HISTORY AND PROBLEmS LX-X
(1955) [hereinafter cited as SIOAFOOS]; Hartman, Municipal Income Taxation, 31
RocKY MT. L. Rnv. 123 (1959) ; Masotti & Kugelman, The Municipal Income Tax
as an Approach to the Urban Fiscal Crisis, 45 J. URBAN L. 113 (1967) [hereinafter
cited as Masotti & Kugelman]; Comment, Municipal Personal Income Taxation
of Nonresidents, 31 OHIO ST. L.J. 770 (1970). See generally U.S. ADvisoRy
COIM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, URBAN AmERICA AND THE FED-
ERAL SYSTEM 7-17 (1969).
3. Masotti & Kugelman 113.
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the revenue can be spent.4 Metropolitanization, the union of political
subdivisions in a metropolitan area, involves a substantial loss of city
independence.5 Only self-imposed taxation preserves the complete in-
dependence of the city.
The mainstay of municipal taxation, the property tax, although a
relatively stable tax, has proved inadequate. The property tax is
inelastic; it cannot keep up with inflation. While rates and total val-
uation have increased sharply, the property tax as a percentage of
total tax receipts has remained at approximately 14.5% over the past
20 years.6 Moreover, the property tax is increasingly criticized as ex-
ceedingly regressive and subject to inequality in treatment of tax-
payers due to underassessment and incomplete rolls.7 Finally, the
property tax is based on the theory that those who receive services
are taxable within the district for their assessed property.8 The flight
to suburbia has dispelled the validity of this theory.
Several major cities" have turned to municipal earnings or income
taxes,10 not to replace, but to supplement existing taxes, especially
general property taxes."' The earnings tax is, most importantly, a
significant revenue producer.12 It is highly responsive to inflation,
unlike the property tax.13 It is capable of relatively equitable and
4. See generally U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS,
FISCAL BALANCE IN THE AMERICAN FISCAL SYSTEM (1967); U.S. ADVISORY
COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, STATE AM TO LOCAL GOVERN-
MENT (1969).
5. Comment, Municipal Personal Income Taxation of Nonresidents, supra note
2, at 771.
6. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES 409 (1972). See generally TAx INSTITUTE OF AMERICA, THE PROPERTY
TAX: PROBLEMS AND POTENTIALS (1967).
7. SGAPOOS 145. See generally U.S. ADVISORY COMm'N ON INTERGOVERN-
MENTAL RELATIONS, URBAN AMERICA AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 16-17 (1969).
8. See Hartman, supra note 2, at 123.
9. Some of the major cities with this type of tax include Kansas City, St.
Louis, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Cleveland, Cincinnati, Columbus, Akron, Dayton,
Toledo and Louisville.
10. This type of tax has been variously referred to as an earnings tax, payroll
tax, wage tax, earned income tax, occupational license tax, net profits tax, and
gross receipts tax. Taylor, Local Income Taxes After Twenty-One Years, 15 NAT.
TAX J. 113, 115 n.7 (1962).
11. See TAX FOUNDATION, INC., CITY INCOME TAXES 39 (1967).
12. Masotti & Kugelman 114; Taylor, supra note 10, at 117.
13. Masotti & Kugelman 115; Phillips, Philadelphia's Income Tax After Twenty
Years, 11 NAT. TAX J. 241, 243 (1958).
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MUNICIPAL EARNINGS TAXATION
low-cost administration.14 Finally, it relieves the resident taxpayers
of some of the burden of providing city services by making nonresi-
dents who work in the city pay for services that are provided there.15
Based on the belief that even more cities will soon turn to the
municipal earnings tax, this Note will focus on the St. Louis Earn-
ings Tax as a vehicle for an exposition of the problems that beset a
city seeking municipal autonomy in income taxation. The St. Louis
tax incorporates most of the basic features of municipal earnings
taxes and has faced almost every possible legal and political attack
throughout its 25 year history. A comparison of problems encountered
in other jurisdictions will also be made. An understanding of the
pitfalls that plague municipal earnings taxes can help municipal
leaders decide if earnings taxation is desirable and feasible for their
city.
I. THE DRIVE FOR AN EARNINGS TAX
A. The St. Louis Dilemma
The fiscal crisis faced by the City of St. Louis, similar in varying
degrees to that of other large metropolitan areas, has its roots in the
Missouri Constitution of 1875. That document set up two procedures
especially relevant to the St. Louis region. First, it authorized a
"Scheme of Separation" to be drawn up by the Board of Freeholders
of St. Louis County.* Secondly, it enabled the City of St. Louis to
draft its own constitutional home rule charter. 1 On August 22, 1876,
the voters of St. Louis County approved both the Scheme of Separa-
tion and the charter.' s
The separation of the City of St. Louis from St. Louis County
carved out an independent city, subordinate to no other state politi-
cal unit other than the state itself. Anticipating considerable growth,
the city was enlarged from the then predominantly urban area of
17.98 square miles to a total of 61.37 square miles.' 9 The remaining
14. SIGArOOS 59; Masotti & Kugelman 117; Taylor, supra note 10, at 118.
15. SIGAFOOs 71; Masotti & Kugelman 117.
16. Mo. CONST. art. 9, § 20 (1875).
17. Id.
18. R. CoHN, THn HISTORY AND GROWTH OF ST. Louis COUNTY, Mo. 7-8(rev. ed. 1968). The original vote reported that the charter had won by 618
votes and the scheme had lost by 107 votes, but a recount was ordered, and it
was later announced that both had carried. Id.
19. Id. at 14.
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rural area became St. Louis County, encircling St. Louis on the west,
just as the State of Illinois does on the east.
The urban city of St. Louis continued to grow until it peaked in
1930 at a population of 821,960, approximately 59.3% of the metro-
politan area.20 Since then, the area surrounding the city has experi-
enced considerable population growth and urbanization. St. Louis
County jumped from a population of 211,593 in 1930 (15.2% of the
metropolitan area) 21 to 951,700 in 1970 (almost 407 of the metro-
politan area) 22 The city of St. Louis, on the other hand, has de-
clined to an estimated population of 586,400 in 1972 (23.97 of the
metropolitan area).23 Optimal economic land utilization in the city,
inability to annex new land, decay of old buildings without new de-
velopment, the lure of open spaces and lower taxes in suburbia, and
mobility resulting from automobiles and expressways have all con-
tributed to the growth of suburban St. Louis at the expense of the
urban city. Business and industry have followed money and popula-
tion to the land-rich suburbs, leaving the city with the poor and the
elderly.
B. Revenue Crisis
Pressures for increased expenditures by the City of St. Louis during
the post-World War II years were similar to those facing other old
urban centers. The strongest pressures came from demand for higher
quality city services (such as rat control and rubbish collection), the
need to maintain and replace capital equipment, and the upward
inflation spiral affecting the cost of providing services. 2'
Sources of revenue were seriously hampered by the isolation and
decline of St. Louis. The general property tax was the major source
20. ST. Louis CITY PLAN COMM'N, POPULATION 5 (1964). The population of
St. Louis dropped to 816,048 in 1940, but rose again to 856,796 in 1950. By this
latter date the population of the St. Louis region exceeded 1,681,281, so that St.
Louis had declined to about 49% of the population of the St. Louis region. B.
AXELROD, A STATISTICAL SURVEY AND REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE ST. Louis
SMSA 1900-1960, at 3 (1964).
21. ST. Louis CITY PLAN COMM'N, POPULATION 5 (1964).
22. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Aug. 21, 1973, at SA, col. 1.
23. Id.
24. D. Mundinger, An Appraisal of the Fiscal Autonomy of St. Louis, A Home
Rule City: The St. Louis Earnings Tax, A Case Study, June 1956, at 77 (un-
published thesis at Washington University) [hereinafter cited as The St. Louis
Earnings Tax].
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of revenue, but it had reached its optimum in the 1940s.25 The rate
of the property tax was at the constitutional maximum, and assess-
ments were already higher than in the surrounding suburbs.26 The
vast majority of new housing construction was in the suburbs.27 Af-
fluent suburbanites could not be reached through the property tax,
even if they worked and consumed city services in St. Louis. The
next most important sources of tax revenue were license fees and ex-
cise taxes. These were high in the 1940s and also could not be raised
because of competition with surrounding suburbs.28 Other sources
of revenue were static and not highly productive of revenue.29
A crisis was reached in 1946 when the new city budget appropria-
tions exceeded the total from the previous year by approximately
four million dollars.^O On May 24, 1946, the first earnings tax bill
was introduced before the St. Louis Board of Aldermen.31
C. Enactment of the First St. Louis Earnings Tax
The earnings tax was viewed as a means to alleviate continued
deficit spending and as a way to provide better municipal services.
It was modeled after successful municipal earnings taxes enacted
earlier in Philadelphia and Toledo.3 2 A proposal for a payroll tax
had been made previously in St. Louis, but it died in a storm of pro-
test by nonresidents working in the city.3 3 Opposition to the earnings
tax bill was just as strong. Suburban leaders threatened retaliation.
The Mayor of East St. Louis, Illinois, said, "While we have no desire to
pass retaliatory legislation, I believe we would feel it our duty . . .,34
The Mayor of nearby Maplewood, Missouri, threatened to put toll
gates at all entrances to that city and charge each car with a St. Louis
sticker 25? for the use of his city's streets. He added, "My proposal
25. See generally id. at 49-67.
26. Id. at 76.
27. Id. at 56.
28. Id. at 76.
29. Id. at 72, 76.
30. Compare St. Louis, Mo., Ordinance 43628, May 3, 1946, with St. Louis,
Mo., Ordinance 43174, May 4, 1945.
31. The St. Louis Earnings Tax 114.
32. St. Louis Star-Times, March 8, 1946, at 1, col. 1.
33. Id. at 2, col. 1.
34. St. Louis Star-Times, Apr. 17, 1946, at 3, col. 3.
1974]
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is no more ridiculous than [the earnings tax]." 35 A suburban state
legislator introduced a bill in the Missouri General Assembly to pro-
hibit municipalities from levying local income taxes.30 It was killed
in conference committee.37 Some opposed the bill for less parochial
reasons. The St. Louis Star-Times opposed the tax structure:
Each time it's tinkered with, Mayor Kaufmann's proposed mu-
nicipal income tax becomes more outrageous. Now the Alder-
manic Ways and Means Committee has decided to cut out all
exemptions and deductions. In other words, the charwoman
supporting half a dozen children would be taxed at exactly the
same rate as a $100,000-a-year corporation executive with no de-
pendentsl And coupon-clippers, of course, would not have to pay
the levy at all38
The threat of a strike by municipal employees for higher wages
spurred the bill through the Aldermanic Committee.39 The first St.
Louis Earnings Tax was signed into law,40 effective August 1, 1946.41
More than 100 firms refused payment due for the first tax period.42
Carter Carburetor Corporation won a declaratory judgment and in-
junction in a state circuit court;43 appeal to the Supreme Court of
Missouri was taken by the City of St. Louis. 44
II. HomE RULE AND EARNINGS TAXATiON IN MISSOURI
A. Constitutional Home Rule
The Missouri Constitution of 1875 established a new innovation in
American political structures45-a constitutional home rule provision.40
Under this provision, St. Louis became the first charter home rule
35. St. Louis Globe-Democrat, Apr. 26, 1946, at 8A, col. 4.
36. The St. Louis Earnings Tax 114.
37. Id. at 115.
38. St. Louis Star-Times, June 19, 1946, at 26, col. 1. Sec also St. Louis Star-
Times, July 10, 1946, at 16, col. 1.
39. St. Louis Globe-Democrat, June 30, 1946, at 3A, col. 5.
40. St. Louis, Mo., Ordinance 43783, July 18, 1946.
41. The St. Louis Earnings Tax 115.
42. St. Louis Globe-Democrat, Oct. 15, 1946, at 9A, col. 1
43. Carter Carburetor Corp. v. City of St. Louis, 356 Mo. 646, 651, 203
S.W.2d 438 (1947).
44. Id.
45. Schmandt, Municipal Home Rule in Missouri, 1953 WAsli. U.L.Q. 385
[hereinafter cited as Schmandt].
46. Mo. CONST. art. IX, § 16 (1875).
[Vol. 8:123
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol8/iss1/6
MUNICIPAL EARNINGS TAXATION
city.47 The theory behind establishing home rule cities is simply that
a community can best deal with its problems by itself.48 The scope
of the municipality's power to enact revenue producing measures to
deal with local fiscal problems has been unsettled under Missouri
home rule. Both the 1875 and 1945 constitutions contained substan-
tially the same home rule provision for charter cities: "Any city ...
may frame and adopt a charter... consistent with and subject to the
Constitution and laws of the state.. . . 9 This language leaves much
unanswered when the question is whether an earnings tax can be
enacted by a home rule city in the absence of supportive state legis-
lation.
Whatever the drafters of the home rule provision may have en-
visioned as to the scope of local autonomy,50 any hopes of broad
municipal powers were dispelled by judicial decision. The first line
of limitation developed by the Supreme Court of Missouri was set in
State ex rel. Garner v. Missouri & Kansas Telephone Co.2,5 in which
the court held that a home rule city needs legislative approval to exer-
cise a governmental, as distinguished from a proprietary, function.5 2
This decision superseded the previous test that required local charters
to be subject only to general laws of the state.5 3 Now cities had no
power to act unless the activity was proprietary. Fortunately, a second
line of cases qualified Garner. These cases allowed a home rule city
to act when the governmental function exercised was primarily of
47. See text at notes 16-18 supra.
48. See Schmandt 385-86.
49. Mo. CoNsT. art. VI, § 19 (1945). The provision of the 1875 constitu-
tion especially relevant to the St. Louis charter provided somewhat more lyrically
that the charter "shall always be in harmony with and subject to the Constitu-
tion and laws of Missouri ... ." Mo. CONST. art. IX, § 23 (1875).
50. One commentator has suggested:
[TJhe whole thrust of the [1875] convention's efforts does cast doubt upon a
construction of the constitution that limits municipal legislative power to
proprietary functions and governmental functions "of primarily local con-
cern" or which "paramountly concern local matters."
Westbrook, Municipal Home Rule: An Evaluation of the Missouri Experience,
33 Mo. L. R!v. 45, 51 (1968).
51. 189 Mo. 83, 88 S.W. 41 (1905).
52. Id. at 99-100, 88 S.W. at 43.
53. E.g., City of St. Louis v. Meyer, 185 Mo. 583, 84 S.W. 914 (1904).
1974]
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local concern and no general state law denied the city power to act.54
The fate of city autonomy in earnings taxation under these two lines
of thought depended on the classification of the tax. Under the
Garner line, since it was settled that taxation is a governmental func-
tion,5 the city dearly needed legislative authorization to enact an
earnings tax. Under the second line of cases, however, it must be
decided whether the tax is primarily of statewide or local concern. If
dassified as local, no legislative authorization was necessary so long as
there was no conflict with state law.
B. Carter Carburetor
With a confusing background of cases, the Supreme Court of Mis-
souri faced the question of the validity of the St. Louis Earnings Tax
in Carter Carburetor Corp. v. City of St. Louis.50 The City argued
that its charter authorized enactment of an earnings tax and that
legislative authorization was unnecessary since the tax relates solely
to local municipal concerns.57 Carter Carburetor argued that the tax
should be declared void because it was of statewide concern and no
legislative authorization existed for the tax.58
In invalidating the earnings tax, the court took a restrictive view
of the Charter of the City of St. Louis. That charter stated that the
City shall have power "to assess, levy and collect taxes for all general
and special purposes on all subjects or objects of taxation."1; The
court strictly construed the charter grant of power s0 and held that
the charter provision did not specifically authorize a municipal earn-
ings tax.61
54. E.g., Coleman v. Kansas City, 353 Mo. 150, 182 S.W.2d 74 (1944); Kan-
sas City v. J.I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 337 Mo. 913, 87 S.W.2d 195 (1935);
State ex rel. Carpenter v. City of St. Louis, 318 Mo. 870, 2 S.W.2d 713 (1928).
55. Grant v. Kansas City, 431 S.W.2d 89, 92 (Mo. 1968); Coleman v. Kansas
City, 353 Mo. 150, 161, 182 S.W.2d 74, 77 (1944); Kansas City v. J.I. Case
Threshing Mach. Co., 337 Mo. 913, 927, 87 S.W.2d 195, 203 (1935).
56. 356 Mo. 646, 203 S.W.2d 438 (1947).
57. Brief for Appellant, 356 Mo. at 647.
58. Brief for Respondent, 356 Mo. at 650.
59. CHARTER OF THE CiT- OF ST. Louis art. 1, § 1, para. 1 (1914).
60. It has been suggested that, although the general practice is to strictly con-
strue grants of municipal power, the home rule philosophy should indicate that
limitations on municipal power, rather than grants of power, should be strictly
construed. Westbrook, supra note 50, at 69.
61. 356 Mo. at 658, 203 S.W.2d at 444.
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By holding the charter authorization insufficient, the court could
have avoided the difficult issue of whether a city can enact an earnings
tax with proper charter authorization by relying solely on the power of
the constitutional home rule provision. Nevertheless, the court did
indicate in dictum that even with proper charter authorization the
tax would be invalid. The court clearly rejected the City's claim that
the earnings tax was purely of local concern, pointing out that the
tax fell on nonresidents also.62 The court said that the requirement
that charter powers be subject to and consistent with state law6 meant
that specific or implied statutory authority to tax was necessary when
the tax was of statewide concern.6 4 The court apparently followed
the traditional restrictive judicial approach of Dillon's rules 5 which
treats a home rule provision as a grant, not a limitation of municipal
power.
C. Earnings Taxation After Carter Carburetor
After the earnings tax was struck down by the Missouri supreme
court, every cent collected in the past year was to be refunded.66 The
City's revenue problems remained and increased. Shortly thereafter,
the City announced that 1947-48 appropriations would exceed antici-
pated revenue by nearly five million dollars.7 St. Louis needed an
earnings tax; the question was how to enact it. Some felt that, despite
the dictum in Carter Carburetor, a charter amendment to authorize
the earnings tax would be sufficientrs St. Louis could not risk an-
62. Id. at 659, 203 S.W.2d at 444.
63. See text at note 49 supra.
64. 356 Mo. at 655, 659, 203 S.W.2d at 442, 444. The court purported to
follow Kansas City v. Frogge, 352 Mo. 233, 176 S.W.2d 498 (1943), which in-
validated a compensating use tax imposed by the City on goods for which the
state sales tax had not been paid.
65. J. DILLON, TH, LAw OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 55 (2d ed. 1873)
states Dillon's rule of statutory construction:
It is a general and undisputed proposition of law that a municipal corpora-
tion possesses, and can exercise, the following powers, and no others: First,
those granted in express words; second, those necessarily or fairly implied in,
or incident to the powers expressly granted; third, those essential to the de-
clared objects and purposes of the corporation-not simply convenient, but
indispensable. Any fair, reasonable doubt concerning the existence of power
is resolved by the courts against the corporation, and the power is denied.
66. $373,758 had been collected. Declared but unpaid taxes totaled $1,052,947.
St. Louis Star-Times, June 10, 1947, at 1, col. 4.
67. St. Louis Star-Times, June 16, 1947, at 2, col. 2.
68. Schmandt 398. Even the Attorney General of Missouri issued an opinion
that a charter amendment could supply municipal power to enact an earnings
tax. Id.
1974]
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other invalidation. Enabling legislation for city earnings taxation
was introduced in the Missouri General Assembly in February 1948.9
Attempts were made to remove nonresidents from the earnings tax
enabling legislation and to have taxes levied on St. Louis County
residents paid to the County Collector of Revenue. 0 These attempts
were defeated, and the earnings tax enabling legislation was passed
in 1948, effective for two years only.71 The City quickly enacted a
new earnings tax ordinance,72 and the earnings tax was levied suc-
cessfully for two years. In the meantime, a new mayor was elected
on a no-earnings tax platform.- Within six months of taking office
he reversed his position, but the delay was fatal to any chances of
calling a special session of the Missouri General Assembly to enact
new enabling legislation to continue the tax.7 4 The St. Louis Earn-
ings Tax lapsed from 1950 until new enabling legislation was passed
in 1952, authorizing the tax for two more years.75 Finally, in 1953 a
new mayor pushed for enabling legislation that would authorize a
permanent earnings tax.76 Withstanding attempts to provide exemp-
tions and to require a vote by St. Louis County residents before the
tax could be levied on county residents working in the city, state
enabling legislation was passed in 1954. 77 It provided that the tax
69. The St. Louis Earnings Tax 118.
70. Id. at 119.
71. Law of May 28, 1948, [1947] Mo. Laws 308.
72. St. Louis, Mo., Ordinance 44678, July 27, 1948.
73. The St. Louis Earnings Tax 126-27.
74. Frantic efforts were made by St. Louisans to get the Governor to call a
special session. The St. Louis Star-Times, now supporting the earnings tax, de-
livered a particularly impassioned plea in an open letter to the Governor:
You see, governor, it comes to this: A cut in the city budget, especially so
deep a one as this, would mean a cut in city services. And city services af-
fect people intimately.
When you cut a city hospital budget, you don't just make a mark on the
paper. You condemn a Mrs. John Johnson and a Mrs. Richard Smith and
a 3-month-old Roberta Roe to die because you've deprived them of a hos-
pital bed.
When you cut a rat-control budget, you don't just change the figures on
a calculating machine. You condemn a baby in this house and a teenager
in that other one over there to being bitten by rats because the control has
lapsed.
St. Louis Star-Times, May 15, 1950, at 14, col. 2.
75. Mo. Rlv. STAT. §§ 92.110-.200 (Supp. 1951).
76. The St. Louis Earnings Tax 135.
77. Id. at 142.
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would be unlimited in duration if a charter amendment to that effect
were adopted by a three-fifths vote of St. Louis city residents.s A
special election for the charter amendment was called for September
30, 1954. Many residents of St. Louis County led the fight against the
amendment, calling the earnings tax "taxation without representa-
tion." - Support in the city was thrown behind the tax, with leading
citizens running a grass-roots campaign.8 0 The charter amendment
was passed by a vote margin of six to one.8 '
D. Earnings Taxation Under Enabling Legislation
A constitutional attack on the authority to impose an earnings tax
under the state enabling legislation was made in Walters v. City of
St. Louis.82 The Supreme Court of Missouri had little trouble up-
holding the state enabling legislation and the city earnings tax ordi-
nance. The case was affirmed on appeal to the United States Supreme
Court,8 3 but there was no discussion of authority to tax. Subsequent
attacks on the earnings tax did not challenge the authority to impose
an earnings tax as authorized by state enabling legislation14
E. Grant v. Kansas City
Some of the issues in Carter Carburetor re-emerged recently in an-
other challenge to city autonomy in earnings taxation. Kansas City,
Missouri, had been imposing an earnings tax under enabling legisla-
tion providing that the tax shall not exceed one-half per cent a year.85
78. Mo. Rrv. STAT. § 92.200 (Supp. 1955).
79. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Apr. 23, 1954, at IA, col. 1. For a complete ac-
count of the earnings tax charter amendment campaign see The St. Louis Earn-
ings Tax 265-91.
80. One newspaper ran several full pages of pictures showing the services at
stake in the election: pollution control, rat control, mosquito control, ambulance
and school health service, rubbish collection, and street repairs. One picture of a
property assessor looking at a house was entitled "An Unsatisfactory Substitute."
Another picture of a stream of commuters' autos was entitled "Earnings Tax
Compels County Residents to Pay Their Share of Benefits Received." St. Louis
Post-Dispatch, Sept. 26, 1954, Pictures, at 1-3.
81. The St. Louis Earnings Tax 288-89.
82. 364 Mo. 56, 259 S.W.2d 377 (1953).
83. 347 U.S. 231 (1954).
84. See Barhorst v. City of St. Louis, 423 S.W.2d 843 (Mo. 1967); Arnold
v. Berra, 366 S.W.2d 321 (Mo. 1963).
85. Mo. REv. STAT. § 92.230 (Supp. 1963).
1974]
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The City had then sought a charter amendment that would authorize
an earnings tax on up to one per cent.8s In Grant v. Kansas City,"7
the City sought to sustain the levy, arguing that the holding in Carter
Carburetor only required clear charter authorization for the earnings
tax,88 and that the enabling statute and its rate limitation was un-
necessary and ineffective because the people of a constitutional home
rule city had the power to authorize an earnings tax for local govern-
ment purposes.19 Respondent relied on the Carter Carburetor dictum
that an earnings tax needed state enabling legislation since it was a
matter of statewide concern; 90 therefore Kansas City could not exceed
the specific statutory tax rate limitation.9 Ten home rule cities of
Missouri, asserting that their right to self-government through local
taxation was at stake,92 argued in support of Kansas City's assertion
that home rule power can sustain the earnings tax,93 and that the
state enabling legislation was unnecessary and ineffectual.-4 The Su-
preme Court of Missouri affirmed Carter Carburetor's view of the
earnings tax as a matter of statewide concern. 95 The court held that
the tax increase would be invalid under the constitutional home rule
provision requiring charters to be consistent with and subject to the
laws and constitution of the state.9 6
86. See generally 35 Mo. L. Rxv. 108 (1970).
87. 431 S.W.2d 89 (Mo. 1968).
88. Brief for Appellant at 9-17.
89. Id. at 25-34.
90. Brief for Respondent at 8-10.
91. Id. at 10-18.
92. Brief for Amici Curiae at 4.
93. Id. at 8-10.
94. Id. at 10-13.
95. 431 S.W.2d at 92-93.
96. Id. at 93. Note that the issue in Grant differs from Carter Carburetor in
that the former involves a charter provision exceeding power given by statute,
while the latter involves an attempt to exert new taxing power without any
statutory authority. Nevertheless, Grant indicates the problems arising from the
city having to go to the legislature for enabling legislation as suggested by Carter
Carburetor; the city cannot even change its rates without permission of the
General Assembly.
Two interesting concurring opinions in Grant seem to reject the Carter Car-
buretor assertion that enabling authority is necessary for enactment of an earn-
ings tax, but they agree that while the enabling statute stands the city cannot
exceed its express limitations. 431 S.W.2d at 94 (Eager & Seiler, JJ., concurring).
The majority also indicates some hesitancy to follow the Carter Carburetor dic-
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F. Conclusions
The Missouri Constitution of 1875 presented a grand experiment
in municipal autonomy and initiative in local self-government. Re-
strictive judicial interpretation of the constitutional home rule pro-
vision has effectively emasculated autonomy in the field of local earn-
ings taxation. As a result, the cities of Missouri must return to
the state legislature whenever a new form of tax or a new rate is
desired. This result belies the theory behind home rule: that a com-
munity can best deal with its problems by itself. What can a legislator
from Kirksville or Branson, Missouri, realizing that he is elected to
represent his constituency, be expected to know or care about the
forms of taxation that are necessary to sustain city services in the ur-
ban core city of St. Louis?
Several other disadvantages flow from this restrictive judicial atti-
tude.9 7 Chief among these is the fact that municipal requests for
enabling legislation draw state legislators away from their primary
responsibility for formulation of statewide policy. Other disadvan-
tages are that special city enabling legislation may not receive the
time and considered attention that it needs, and that the city may
tend to bargain away its legislative power by marshalling support for
recurring requests for new legislation.
III. MUNICIPAL EARNINGS TAXATION AUTONOMY UNDER
OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL HOME RULE PROVISIONS
The Ohio constitution confers upon municipalities the "authority
to exercise all powers of local self-government and to adopt and en-
force within their limits such local... regulations, as are not in con-
flict with general laws."98 Although similar to the Missouri home
rule provision, the "general laws" limitation has been interpreted
only to qualify the second of the two grants in the Ohio provision.99
tum: "We have not considered the question as to whether a special charter city
would have the authority to amend its charter to provide an earnings tax in the
absence of an applicable conflicting state statute on the subject." 431 S.W.2d at
94.
97. See generally Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal Power Under Home Rule:
A Role for the Courts, 48 MiNx. L. REv. 643, 655-56 (1964); Westbrook, supra
note 50, at 72-74.
98. OHIo CONST. art. XVIII, § 3.
99. See generally Fordhamr & Mallison, Local Income Taxation, 11 OHIo ST.
L.J. 217, 224 (1950).
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
In State ex rel. Zielonka v. Carrel 00 the Supreme Court of Ohio in-
terpreted this section so as to uphold a Cincinnati occupational tax
in the absence of state enabling legislation. The court stated: "There
can be no doubt that the grant of authority to exercise all powers of
local government includes the power of taxation .... 101 The court
went on, however, to state in dictum that the constitutional home
rule provision 02 impliedly restricts municipal taxing power whenever
state legislation results in city-state competition for revenue.1 03 This
dictum was quickly blown into a full-fledged doctrine of pre-emp-
tion. 0 4 In varying degrees, this doctrine has been applied to invali-
date city taxes whenever there is the same or similar levy on the state
level1 05 Significantly, the Ohio supreme court has limited this pre-
emption doctrine to situations where the state is in actual competition
with the city. 00 The field of municipal earnings taxation therefore
belongs solely to the home rule cities of Ohio unless they are clearly
pre-empted by the state entering the field. Under this legislative-
judicial attitude, municipal income taxes have flourished in Ohio,
with levies in all the major cities and numerous smaller home rule
cities. 07
Under the Colorado home rule provision, power is given to cities
to exercise "the full right of self-government in both local and mu-
100. 99 Ohio St. 220, 124 N.E. 134 (1919). See also Glander & Dewey,
Municipal Taxation: A Study of the Pre-emption Doctrine, 9 OHIO ST. L.J.
72 (1948).
101. 99 Ohio St. at 227, 124 N.E. at 136.
102. OHIo CONST. art. XVIII, § 13 states: "Laws may be passed to limit the
power of municipalities to levy taxes and incur debts for local purposes ..
103. 99 Ohio St. at 228, 124 N.E. at 136.
104. See Firestone v. City of Cambridge, 113 Ohio St. 57, 148 N.E. 470 (1925);
City of Cincinnati v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 112 Ohio St. 493, 147 N.E. 806
(1925).
105. See East Ohio Gas Co. v. City of Akron, 7 Ohio St. 2d 73, 218 N.B.2d
608 (1966); Youngstown Municipal Ry. v. City of Youngstown, 154 Ohio St.
311, 95 N.E.2d 585 (1950); Haefner v. City of Youngstown, 147 Ohio St. 58,
68 N.E.2d 64 (1946). But cf. Benua v. City of Columbus, 170 Ohio St. 64, 162
N.E.2d 467 (1959), in which the court upheld a municipal income tax against
the contention that the tax as applied to rents was a tax upon the property itself,
which the state had pre-empted through property taxation.
106. See Angell v. City of Toledo, 153 Ohio St. 179, 91 N.E.2d 250 (1950).
107. CCII STATE TAx GumE, ALL STATES 111 15-735 to 15-739 (2d ed. 1967).
The recent enactment of an Ohio state personal income tax included a specific
provision that the state tax does not pre-empt local income taxes. OIo REV.
CODE ANN. § 5747.02 (Page 1973).
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nicipal matters .... "108 In City & County of Denver v. Sweet,109 the
Supreme Court of Colorado applied Dillon's rule to hold that Den-
ver's home rule taxing autonomy is limited to express or reasonably
implied fields of local concern."10 The court then held that the exist-
ence of constitutional authority for the state to enact an income tax
indicates that earnings taxation is a matter of statewide concern;*"'
therefore the City of Denver could not tax earnings without legisla-
tive approval.1"2 An interesting exception to this lack of autonomy
in earnings taxation developed in City & County of Denver v. Duffy
Storage & Moving Co." 3 In that case, eleven years after Sweet, the
Colorado supreme court faced a new Denver income tax of 1.4% and
an occupational privilege tax of two dollars a month on employers
and employees. The court adhered to Sweet, albeit reluctantly, on
the principle of stare decisis and invalidated the city income tax;""
but the court upheld the levy of the occupational privilege tax as
within the authority of the home rule city.1 5 A strong dissent argued
that the tax amounted to an income tax."10 Thus it appears that home
rule cities of Colorado may enact an earnings tax, even without legis-
lative approval, as long as the tax is hypertechnically disguised as
an occupational privilege rather than an income tax.
Several other states have cities with broad home rule powers, but
these cities have refrained from entering the field of earnings taxa-
tion. In Oregon it is contended that the Oregon home rule provi-
sions 17 and the Oregon supreme court's interpretations of these pro-
visions allow cities to enact local income taxes without enabling legis-
108. CoLo. CONST. art. XX, § 6.
109. 138 Colo. 41, 329 P.2d 441 (1958).
110. Id. at 46-47, 52, 329 P.2d at 444, 447.
111. See, e.g., CoLo. CONST. art. X, § 17.
112. 138 Colo. at 52, 329 P.2d at 446. See generally Klemme, The Powers of
Home Rule Cities in Colorado, 36 U. COLO. L. Rtv. 321 (1964).
113. 168 Colo. 191, 450 P.2d 339 (1969).
114. Id. at ....... 450 P.2d at 342.
115. Id. at ......... 450 P.2d at 343-45. See also State Farm Mdut. Auto Ins. Co.
v. Temple, ....... Colo ......... , 491 P.2d 1371 (1971) (upholding the tax in spite
of a state statute prohibiting local taxes on insurers).
116. 168 Colo. at ......... 450 P.2d at 346-49 (Hodges, Kelley & Lee, JJ., dissent-
ing). The Supreme Court of Kentucky has likewise upheld an occupational license
tax despite the fact that the court refused to accept a city income tax. City of
Louisville v. Sebree, 308 Ky. 420, 214 S.W.2d 248 (1948).
117. See Oa. CONST. art. XI, § 2.
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lation.118 A similar contention has been made in California, 19 where
the constitutional home rule provision gives a city power to enact
"all laws and regulations in respect to municipal affairs .... ,,120
Autonomy in California local taxation results from judicial inter-
pretations that taxation is a local concern 121 and that the home rule
provision is only a limitation, not a grant, of power to the city.122
IV. THE NEW MIssouRI HOME RuLE PROVISION
In late 1971 voters at a special election adopted a new Missouri
home rule section that provides:
Any city which adopts or has adopted a charter for its own gov-
ernment, shall have all powers which the general assembly . . .
has authority to confer upon any city, provided such powers are
consistent with the Constitution of this State, and are not limited
or denied either by the charter or adopted [sic] or by statute. 23
The new home rule provision appears to be a powerful one for
Missouri cities. The ambiguity of the previous home rule provision
has been practically eliminated. The new provision is quite similar
to that in Dean Fordham's "Model Constitutional Provisions for Home
Rule," which were drafted for the American Municipal Association.124
118. Kehrll & Mattis, The Authority of Home Rule Cities and Counties in
Oregon to Levy Sales and Income Taxes-An Affirmative View, 5 WILLA ETTIL
L.J. 183 (1969). Contra, Stoyles, Versus Oregon City or County Income or Sales
Taxes, 4 WILLAMETTE L.J. 462 (1967).
119. Cohn, Municipal Revenue Powers in the Context of Constitutional Home
Rule, 51 Nw. U.L. REv. 27, 42 (1956).
120. CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 8(j).
121. See Franklin v. Peterson, 87 Cal. App. 2d 727, 197 P.2d 788 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1948).
122. West Coast Advertising Co. v. City & County of San Francisco, 14 Cal.
2d 516, 95 P.2d 138 (1939). In this case, the California supreme court held that
cities need not seek legislative authorization to levy taxes for revenue purposes,
and that the absence of express charter authority is not a bar to the exercise of a
particular taxing power unless the charter itself expresses a limitation. See gen-
erally Antieau, Municipal Power to Tax-Its Constitutional Limitations, 8 VAND.
L. REv. 698 (1955).
123. Mo. CONST. art. 6, § 19(a).
124. The draft reads:
A municipal corporation which adopts a home rule charter may exercise any
power or perform any function which the legislature has power to devolve
upon a non-home rule charter municipal corporation and which is not denied
to that municipal corporation by its home rule charter, is not denied to all
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This formulation places the power to control excesses by home rule
cities primarily in express statutes of the legislature, not in interpreta-
tion by the judiciary.125
Several modifications of previous case law should flow from this
new provision. Both the holding and the dictum of Carter Carburetor
may be constitutionally overruled. As for the specific holding,-6 it
seems dear that a restrictive approach is no longer to be followed in
construing city charters. The Charter of the City of St. Louis should
no longer be viewed as only an express grant of power, but all powers
that the state legislature may devolve upon any city may be exercised
by a home rule city unless its charter expressly limits those powers.
Municipal earnings taxation should be upheld under a charter that
grants power "to assess, levy and collect taxes for all general and spe-
cial purposes on all subjects or objects of taxation." As for the dictum
in Carter Carburetor,27 the new home rule provision seems to reject
implicitly any requirement that enabling legislation is necessary for
municipal earnings taxes. The elimination of the requirement that
the charter be "subject to the laws"'12 indicates that state statutes must
either clearly imply a limitation or expressly prohibit the power in
order to restrict municipal taxing autonomy. Dillon's rule is dearly
to be rejected in a construction of the Missouri constitutional home
rule provision.
A serious problem remains under the new Missouri home rule pro-
vision-what to do with the holding of Grant? Both the majority and
the concurring opinions agreed that once a city receives enabling
legislation, it cannot avoid the express statutory limitations on the
rate. 1 9 If the dictum of Carter Carburetor is rejected under the new
home rule charter municipal corporations by statute and is within such limita-
tions as may be established by statute.
Reprinted in D. MANDELKER, MANAGING OUR URBAN ENVIRONMENT 126 (2d ed.
1971).
125. In speaking of the Fordham formulation, one commentator states:
A court sensitive to the limitation on its own competence that is postulated
by the separation of powers, would rarely, if ever, hold that a particular
power . . . exceeded municipal initiative. To do so would require . . . that
the court also be prepared to hold that the legislature could not confer the
power upon a municipality ....
Sandalow, supra note 97, at 691.
126. See text at notes 59-61 supra.
127. See text at notes 62-65 supra.
128. See text at note 49 supra.
129. See notes 95-96 and accompanying text supra.
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home rule provision, then the enabling legislation is unnecessary.
Nevertheless, Grant would apparently require that any express limi-
tations in state statutes be given effect. Failure to repeal certain pro-
visions of the enabling legislation (such as rate limitations) 's0 may
seriously hamper the home rule city's power to tax despite the ap-
parent intent that the city be given more freedom to act under the
new home rule provision.131 This result should be avoided at all costs.
If not, a technical loophole can be used to avoid constitutional over-
ruling of a judicial interpretation.
CONCLUSION
The experience in Missouri with state enabling legislation indicates
its undesirability in the field of municipal earnings taxation. Forcing
a city to turn to the state legislature for power to enact local earnings
taxes flies in the face of the purpose behind home rule provisions.
Under the different forms of constitutional home rule provisions
discussed above, it seems apparent that no provision dictates a finding
of invalidity for local attempts at autonomy in earnings taxation. The
Missouri and Colorado results flow from a restrictive attitude of
judicial interpretation prevalent in the era prior to 1960. Missouri
especially seems to have suffered from judicial doctrines originating
in the early years of experimentation with home rule. The urban
130. See Mo. Rav. STAT. §§ 92.110-.300 (1971).
131. While the rate limitations of enabling legislation may be inconsistent with
the apparent attempt to prevent the necessity for such enabling legislation, not all
state limitations would be detrimental to autonomy in municipal earnings taxation.
Since the new Missouri home rule provision could devolve municipal earnings tax
power on all charter cities, a further restriction on the class of cities in Missouri
that can enact such a tax may be necessary if it is felt that an earnings tax is only
appropriate for cities such as St. Louis and Kansas City. The disadvantages of
allowing taxation in smaller charter cities, especially in suburban areas, are
numerous. Costs of administration usually are higher per capita in smaller cities.
SIOAFOos 59-61. Credits or reciprocal agreements between neighboring cities may
also be necessary to prevent taxation of the same income for a person who resides
in one earnings tax city but works in another. This situation can be especially
complex if the rates or tax base in neighboring earnings tax cities are different.
Restricting the tax to large urban cities by express state statute is justifiable.
Those areas are the type that have a large percentage of nonresident workers who
would otherwise escape almost all taxation for services provided them in the
central cities. Perhaps it was such a fear of fiscal irresponsibility in small charter
cities or a chaotic situation resulting from proliferation of competing earnings
taxes that led to the restrictive judicial interpretations of local autonomy in earn-
ings taxation.
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fiscal crisis has now clearly dictated the need to resort to home rule
provisions for quick and effective local action.
The original Missouri home rule provision could have been inter-
preted in the same manner as the Ohio provision. This approach
would have allowed municipal autonomy in earnings taxation subject
only to express or clearly implied state statutory limitations. The
contrary result developed from an ambiguous home rule provision
requiring excessive judicial interpretation. 13 2
The intent to establish the home rule provision as only a limitation
on home rule powers, as in Ohio and California, and not as a grant
of powers, clearly appears in the new Missouri home rule provision.
Undercurrents in the Grant and Duffy cases indicate that the present
Missouri and Colorado supreme courts may welcome a chance to reject
previous restrictive judicial decisions as outmoded elements in ancient
home rule history. The new home rule provision allows Missouri a
chance to make a fresh start and to pioneer a new modem attitude
toward municipal autonomy in earnings taxation.
132. Sandalow, supra note 97, at 658-59; Schmandt 387.
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